Study on Record Linkage of Anonymizied Data by KIKUCHI Hiroaki et al.
Study on Record Linkage of Anonymizied Data
著者 KIKUCHI Hiroaki, YAMAGUCHI Takayasu, HAMADA
Koki, YAMAOKA Yuji, OGURI Hidenobu, SAKUMA Jun
journal or
publication title
IEICE transactions on fundamentals of
electronics, communications and computer
sciences
volume E101.A
number 1
page range 19-28
year 2018-01
権利 (C) 2018 The Institute of Electronics,
Information and Communication Engineers
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00152030
doi: 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.19
IEICE TRANS. FUNDAMENTALS, VOL.E101–A, NO.1 JANUARY 2018
19
INVITED PAPER Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security
Study on Record Linkage of Anonymizied Data∗
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Yuji YAMAOKA††††, Hidenobu OGURI†††††, Nonmembers, and Jun SAKUMA††††††,Member
SUMMARY Data anonymization is required before a big-data business
can run effectively without compromising the privacy of personal informa-
tion it uses. It is not trivial to choose the best algorithm to anonymize
some given data securely for a given purpose. In accurately assessing the
risk of data being compromised, there needs to be a balance between utility
and security. Therefore, using common pseudo microdata, we propose a
competition for the best anonymization and re-identification algorithm. The
paper reported the result of the competition and the analysis on the effective
of anonymization technique. The competition result reveals that there is a
tradeoff between utility and security, and 20.9% records were re-identified
in average.
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1. Introduction
The volume of digital data is growing exponentially. Many
business organizations collect our personal data with the
aims of sharing this data with partners and using data-mining
algorithms to extract useful knowledge related to the behav-
ior of customers and their preferences for goods. However,
there is a risk that an individual could be identified from the
big-data collection.
1.1 Attribute Estimation
Gong and Liu [5] proposed attribute inference attack inte-
grating the social friendship structures of the target users
and the user behaviors, called social-behavior-attribute net-
work model, and demonstrated their proposed attack using a
large-scale dataset collected from Google+ and Google play.
They claimed that the inferring attribute becomes qualita-
tively different if attackers use both social structure and user
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behaviors. They demonstrated that their proposed attack cor-
rectly infer the cities a user lived in for 57% of the users and
the success rate can be improved to over 90% if the attacker
selectively attacks a half of the users.
Attribute inference could be real privacy threat in big-
data business and the latest result implied that protecting the
attribute estimation attempt is quite hard for attackers who
motivated with learning partial knowledge of their target
users. First, the attack can be possible using only publicly
available information. The quantity of the open data in-
creases year by year and the attacker would have access many
resources. Second, the state-of-art technologies allows us to
estimate more accurately. Third, the attribute inference is
authorized in business perspective and the estimated data is
not classified as personal data.
1.2 Record Linkage
Record linkage across over multiple databases is greatly re-
quired for medical applications including disease registries,
electronic medical records, cohort suited and case control
studies. However, record linkage using personally identify-
ing information (PII) was already not done anymore because
of the reasons; sharing of PII is prohibited by regulations,
potential privacy risks by a third party with knowledge, and
a person’s PII at two different databases will not be exactly
the same.
Dewri, Ong, and Thurimella [6] addressed the record
linkage issues by precomputing repetitive cryptographic op-
erations of one-way hash function with commutative prop-
erty, in conjunction with similarities of the sets of bigrams.
They demonstrated their proposed method using dataset
from North Carolina Voters Registration database obtained
in 2012 consisting of 7,088,370 individuals. With paralleliz-
ing computations over a small number of hardware threads,
and truncating large encryption outputs, they successfully
performed record matching on datasets as large as 100,000
records in less than 10 minutes.
1.3 Anonymization Competition
To prevent data from being re-identified, many anonymiza-
tion algorithms have been proposed, aiming to retain the
utility of data that have been anonymized. Anonymization
algorithms employ various operations, including suppres-
sion of attributes or records, generalization of values, re-
Copyright © 2018 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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placing values with pseudonyms, perturbation with random
noise, sampling, rounding, swapping, top/bottom coding,
and micro-aggregation [2], [11].
It is not trivial to anonymize data so that the risk of
re-identification is eliminated because there is a tradeoff be-
tween utility and security. If we alter the data sufficiently, the
data can be secure against re-identification attempt. How-
ever, too much anonymized data loses the accuracy as well.
Hence, we need to carefully determine the best algorithm
for data anonymization that should be secure against re-
identification risk without loss of data utility.
To address the issues in anonymization, we propose a
data anonymization and re-identification competition using
the common dataset [1] in 2015. We adopt the educational
dataset “pseudomicrodata”, whichwas synthesized by a gov-
ernmental agency, the National Statistics Center (NSTAC).
This is based on real statistics about income and expendi-
ture for Japanese households. To simplify our analysis, we
assume there is a maximum-knowledge adversary who can
access the original dataset before anonymization. This as-
sumption makes our competition clear and simple. We have
defined some utility measures, combined with some security
measures in [1].
In this paper, we report the results of our competition
from utility and security perspectives and examine the sub-
mitted anonymized data to find the best strategy for making
data secure against re-identification. Our analysis includes
the relationship between the utility measures and the effect
of k-anonymization. We also found a simple permutation
makes the data secure against re-identification without los-
ing the accuracy of data. However, it is a sort of cheating
and we need to prevent data processer from performing this
type of permutation. The results of the competition provide
useful knowledge related to data anonymization as well as
evaluation of re-identification risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Sect. 2, we define fundamental definitions for data
anonymization and re-identification in general. The set of at-
tributes of the dataset is partitioned into two disjoint subsets,
referred to as the quasi identifier (QI) and sensitive attribute
(SA). We also introduce the idea of a maximum-knowledge
adversary. In Sect. 3, we show the result of the competition
and the distribution of utility measures. We also evaluate the
re-identification techniques used in the competition, which
provide the baseline of fundamental procedures. We con-
clude our study in Sect. 4.
2. Anonymization
2.1 Outline of the Competition
In October 21st, 2015, we held the first competition for
data anonymization and re-identification, PWSCUP (Privacy
Workshop CUP) 2015 “Ice and Fire”†, in Nagasaki, Japan.
†The “ice” and “fire” mean anonymization and re-identification
attempts, respectively.
Table 1 Competition data.
Phase Preliminary Final
Date Aug. 24–Oct. 9, 2015 Oct. 21, 2015
De-identification 4 weeks 20min
Re-identifying 2 weeks 60min
Venue (Online) Nagasaki Brick Hall
Teams 17 (81 people) 12 (20 people)
It was organized by the SIG of Computer Security (CSEC)
of the Information Processing Society Japan (IPSJ).
A total of 17 teams (of more than 80 people) partici-
pated in the competition. Most participants were privacy-
technologies researchers from universities and industrial lab-
oratories. Table 1 provides information about the competi-
tion.
2.2 Fundamental Definition
A dataset X consists of n records, x1, . . . , xn, of the
form xi = (x1i , . . . , x
m
i ), defined in terms of m attributes,
X1, . . . , Xm. Let IX be a record index sequence for database
X . For example, IX = (1, . . . , n) is identity. We treat a
dataset as containing personal data if some attributes are re-
lated to personal information such as name or postal address
and are expressive enough to identify a particular subject.
Let R(X ) be a range of attribute X . Attributes have
several types of value, such as continuous, categorical, or
discrete. A continuous attribute such as payment has a range
of integer values, or rational numbers. A categorical attribute
has a finite range of symbols. Attributes can be classified
into two classes: static attributes, such as name, sex, mari-
tal status, and postal code; and dynamic attributes, such as
location, money balance, blood pressure, heart rate, and dis-
ease name. A set of attributes is known as QID if they link
the records generated by a single user. Various properties
to reduce the risk of re-identification from an anonymized
dataset have been studied such as k-anonymity [18], [19] and
`-diversity [20]. The dynamic attributes often are referred
to as sensitive attributes (SAs) because they may contain
critical information that the user may wish to hide.
2.3 Anonymization
Many anonymization algorithms have been proposed to pre-
serve privacy, while aiming to retain the utility of the data
that have been anonymized. That is, the data are made
less specific so that a particular individual cannot be identi-
fied. Anonymization algorithms employ various operations,
including suppression of attributes or records, generaliza-
tion of values, replacing values with pseudonyms, pertur-
bation with random noise, sampling, rounding, swapping,
top/bottom coding, and micro-aggregation [2], [11].
In this paper, we use an anonymization as a general
process possibly implemented bymultiple algorithms, rather
than by a particular algorithm.
Definition 2.1: Let Y be an anonymized dataset generated
from a dataset X . The anonymized dataset Y comprises n′
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(n′ ≤ n) records, y1, . . . , yn′ of the tuple of m′ (m′ ≤ m)
attributes chosen from {X1, . . . , Xm} of X . A record y j =
(y1j , . . . , y
m′
j ) of Y is de-identified from the corresponding
record xi of X such that j = pi(i), where pi is a mapping
pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n′}.
The anonymizing processes such as sampling, swapping, or
shuﬄing are represented by means of the anonymized record
index sequence IY = (iY1 , . . . , i
Y
n′ ) = (pi
−1(1), . . . , pi−1(n′)).
Note that pi is not necessarily a surjection of IX because
some anonymization methods such as “top coding” sup-
presses some (unsafe) records that are likely to be identified.
Therefore, the range of pi is generally smaller than that of the
domain.
Figure 1 illustrates a sample anonymized dataset. The
figure shows how an anonymized process is specified by
means of anonymized record index sequences IY . In the
example, IY = (4, 1, 2) where pi(4) = 1, pi(1) = 2, and the
third record x3 has been dropped for some reason.
2.4 Re-Identification
A re-identification is a process that attempts to identify the
record subject xi from the anonymized record y j based on
some features of the original record. However, the term “re-
identification” is ambiguous because some possible mean-
ings have to be interpreted in context.
Consider the examples of privacy threads in the data
anonymization in Fig. 2. The dataset X of two records
with four attributes, “name,” “year,” “good,” “payment,” are
anonymized as the lower table Y , where names are replaced
by pseudonyms, values are rounded, and the values “coffee”
and “tea” are unified as a general “beverage.” In the exam-
ple, re-identification could happen via the following related
events;
1. re-identifying the record subject “Kikuchi” from esti-
mated record values,
2. linking two records by the pseudonym 1055 being the
same owner,
3. estimating hidden attribute values,
4. exposing contact information about the subject and re-
ceiving an advertised message,
5. matching to another data resource.
Among these possible and related events, this paper
adopts a strict definition of re-identification:
Definition 2.2 (Re-identification): Given an anonymized
dataset Y , an adversary estimates the record index sequence
IE = (iE1 , . . . , i
E
n′ )  I
Y by employing an algorithm E.
For the example in Fig. 1, the record index is estimated
as IE = (3, 1, 2), for which the elements 1 and 2 are correctly
estimated, but the first (3) is a false estimate.
2.5 The QI and SA Subsets
Attributes in a dataset X are partitioned into three subsets:
Fig. 1 Original, anonymized and estimated record index sequences.
Fig. 2 Privacy threads and re-identification.
Table 2 Statistics for the NSTAC pseudo microdata [10].
Dataset # of records # of QIs # of SAs
Expenditure Income
n m
Full 32,027 14 149 34
Simple 8,333 14 11 N/A
(1) a direct identifier such as a name and social security num-
ber (2) a QI subset comprising a combination of attributes,
such as sex, age and zip code, identifies unique individual,
and (3) other attributes that contains sensitive attributes (SA)
such as disease and religion.
2.6 Common Dataset
The NSTAC “pseudo microdata” is a dataset of family in-
come and expenditure in Japan, which was synthesized in
2012 by NSTAC for educational purposes in schools [10].
The dataset comprises 59,400 records, each representing the
income and expenditure for a family (including 5,002 single-
person households), in 2004. The statistical features of the
real data were preserved in the NSTAC pseudo microdata
under the assumption that the occurrence of values in all
continuous attributes are (logarithmic) normally distributed.
Table 2 shows some fundamental statistics for the
NSTAC pseudo microdata. The simple dataset comprises
n = 8, 333 records, and is a subset of the full dataset, being
limited to four-person household with at least one is em-
ployed. The dataset involves m = 25 attributes, where the
first 14 attributes describe features of the household, such as
numbers of people, the number employed, and the age and
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Table 3 Measures for utility (U1, . . . ,U6) and for security S1, S2, E1, . . . , E4.
No. measures meaning target
U1 meanMAE Error of means for all SAs SA
U2 crossMean Error of mean of some SAs for some QIs QI
U3 crossCnt Error of record counts for some QIs QI
U4 corMAE Error of correlations of all pair of SAs SA
U5 IL Error of all values of all records QI, SA
U6 nrow Number of records N/A
S1 k-anony k-anonymity (minimum k) QI
S2 k-anonyMean k-anonymity (mean k) QI
E1 IdRand re-id by a random guess in a subset of records with QIs Qi
E2 IdSA re-id by searching in a subset of records with QIs QI, SA
E3 Sort re-id by sorting for sum of values of SAs SA
E4 SA21 re-id by searching all records for 21th SA SA
sex breakdown. These are classified as QIs. The remaining
11 attributes are treated as SAs that indicate monthly subto-
tals of expenditure for items such as foods, accommodation,
lightning and heating, clothes, medical treatment, and travel.
2.7 Players and Rules
The following types of players compete to demonstrate their
skills.
1. An anonymizing player (“ice”)
performs anonymization of given pseudo microdata X ,
while aiming to make re-identification impossible, and
submits the anonymized data Y and the corresponding
record index IY to the judge. Note that Y is available to
everyone, while IY is sent only to the judge.
2. An adversary (“fire”),
attempts to estimate the most likely mapping between
the original data X and the anonymized data Y , sub-
mitting the estimated record index IE for algorithm E
to the judge.
3. The judge,
receives the anonymized data Y and publishes mea-
sures in terms of utility of the data and the security
against risk of re-identification using the sample algo-
rithms. The judge evaluates the re-identification ratios
of the estimated record index IE for each adversary and
declares the winner.
Our competition involves the following tasks.
1. Data anonymization.
Given an original X (of NSTAT pseudo micro-
data), perform data anonymization and submit the
anonymized data Y and the corresponding record in-
dex IY . A player is allowed to submit at most three
different anonymized datasets for the original data X .
The player whose anonymized data is the most useful
and the most secure against any re-identification attacks
will be the winner for this task.
2. Re-identification.
Given some anonymized data Ys, estimate the process
of data anonymization and submit the estimated record
index IE . An adversary is allowed to submit only one
estimated record index IE for each Y . The adversary
who performs the most accurate re-identification with
the highest ratio† will be the winner for this task.
2.8 Security: re-id
Let Y and IY = (iY1 , . . . , i
Y
n′ ) be some anonymized data and
their corresponding anonymized record index sequence. Let
IE = (iE1 , . . . , i
E
n′ ) be the estimated record index sequence of
Y using re-identification algorithm E. The re-identification
ratio of E is defined as
re-idE (IY, IE ) =
{ j ∈ {1, . . . , n′}|iYj = iEj }
n′
.
Note that re-id(IY, IY ) = 1.0.
We denote the re-identification ratios for the three al-
gorithms, Sort, IdRand, and IdSA by re-idSort , re-idIdRand ,
and re-idIdSA.
2.9 Definition of Utility and Security
Table 3 is the list of measures in terms of utility (U1 . . . ,U5)
and security (S1, S2, E1, . . . , E4). We show the general mean-
ing of these measures with the target attribute (SA or QI).
2.10 The Cheating Permutation
A malicious anonymizing player could cheat in the compe-
tition as follows.
The player lets Y = X but submits IY as some permuta-
tion has been done. For example, yi = xi for all i = 1, . . . , n,
and
IY = (n, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1).
could be submitted.
This cheating does not modify any record in Y and
the utility is therefore maximized. In addition, the re-
identification ratio could be minimized because most al-
gorithms estimate the permutation of the record as IE =
(1, 2, . . . , n), which results in re-id(E) = 0. However, this
†The adversary can be an anonymizing player, but Re-
identification of data anonymized by that person is not counted
in the ratio.
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Fig. 3 The cheating permutation.
data anonymization is clearly meaningless in practice.
Example of the cheating is illustrated in Fig. 3, where
the anonymized record Y = X but the record index |Y is
inconsistent with Y . That results in making all records to be
identified wrongly.
To prevent players from cheating in this way, we intro-
duce the following detection algorithm on the submitted IY
and reduce the security correspondingly.
(Re-identification AYA) Let Y and IY be the
anonymized data of some dataset X and the record index
sequence (iY1 , . . . , i
Y
n′ ). With an estimated record index se-
quence IE in an arbitrary algorithm, the re-identification
algorithm AYA outputs
iAYAi =
{
iiY if |XiiE − Yi | < |XiiY − Yi |,
iE otherwise
3. Competition Result
3.1 The Evaluation System
We developed a system for our competition that provides
a web interface for downloading the original data, submit-
ting and withdrawing anonymized data, and submitting the
estimated record index sequence.
Table 4 shows the technical specifications of our imple-
mentation.
3.2 Competition Result
Table 5 shows the top 10 anonymized data for the competition
involving the measures U1, . . . ,U6 for utility, S1, S2 for k-
anonymity, and E1, . . . , E4, EAYA for re-identification ratios.
For reference purpose, we show the utility and the security
scores for the original dataset X in Table 6. As we expected,
the utilities are almost zero (no error) and the re-id ratios are
close to 1.0 (no security).
The anonymized data are ranked by the sum of utilities
and the security against all re-identification techniques. For
example, the 5th data preserves higher utilities, while the
security is not so good, i.e., most records were re-identified
with re-id of 0.92. On the other hand, some anonymized
data e.g. 4th, 6th and 7th focused on its security rather than
utilities. The first and the second data, submitted by the same
team (02), balanced both scores very well and succeeded that
most recordswere not identified by E1, . . . , E4 as almost zero.
Note that score S1 indicates if the data is altered so that
Table 4 Competition system.
Sever Nifty Cloud (R)
CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) 3.00GHz
Memory 4 GB
R R version 3.2.0
Java Java(TM) SRE 1.8.0_45
Ruby ruby 2.2.2p95
Python Python 2.7.10
k-anonymity is satisfied. For instance, 4th, 6th, and 10th
data guarantee that there are at lest k = 3 records for any
combinations of QIs. The 7th satisfies k = 5 degree of
anonymity.
3.3 Evaluation of Utility Measures
We show the distribution of utility measures U1, . . . ,U6 for
anonymized data (ordered in the measures) in Figs.4, 5, 6,
7, and 8. In the figure, utility measures are normalized as
mean of 0 and variance of 1.0.
Utility measures vary widely. We observed that some
utilitiesU1,U2,U3 (meanMAE, cross) are skewed at the bot-
tom, while utility U5 (IL) is increasing monotonically with
rank. SinceU5 is defined for all values in dataset, it is inter-
preted as the total degree of altering. Hence, we noticed that
in the dataset records were very carefully altered so that the
utility measures (U1, . . . ,U4) were lost.
Several strategies for anonymization were taken. From
the observation of Fig. 9, where utility measures U1,U3,U5
are plotted in the order of U5, we find four large peaks. At
the first one (very left), we think that only QI attributes were
altered without chaining any SA because measure U3 of QI
is high. On the contrary, the third peak (around id 16) shows
the evidence that SAs were altered well without changing
any QI because measures U1 of SA is high. In this way,
we see that a variety of data anonymization strategies were
attempted in the competition.
3.4 Tradeoff between Utility and Security
We find a tradeoff between utility and security for the set of
anonymized data in Fig. 10, where the 24 submitted data are
scattered over the space of the maximum re-id ratio (Y axis)
and the representative utility measureU5 (X axis).
The security against re-identification is maximized
in the cost of utility loss. For example, the cluster of
anonymized data plotted at the right bottom is of high secu-
rity and low utility. On the other hand, the left-top cluster
of anonymized data preserves the property of the original
data X accurately but they are vulnerable against any re-
identification attempt. We indicate the top 5 anonymized
data with their ranks, which are plotted slightly lower than
the tradeoff between utility and security. The secret tech-
niques might be applied to the top data in order to optimize
processing for both security and utility perspectives.
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Table 5 Utilities and Re-id scores of the top 10 anonymized data Y .
rank team ID U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 S1 S2 E1 E2 E3 E4 EAY A Max Ei
1 02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 1.00 13.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
2 02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 1.00 13.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08
3 01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 1.00 36.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.36
4 02 0.00 4321.75 1.54 0.03 0.01 0.00 3.00 36.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.30
5 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 36.07 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.92 0.92
6 15 0.00 31400.95 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.00 3.00 4.86 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.05 0.57 0.57
7 07 0.00 46944.41 2.16 0.00 0.02 0.00 5.00 89.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.63
8 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 36.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.93 0.93
9 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 36.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.93 0.93
10 15 0.00 31572.91 1.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 3.00 4.91 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.05 0.63 0.63
Table 6 Scores of the original dataset X .
team ID U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 S1 S2 E1 E2 E3 E4 Max Ei
X 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 1.00 1.88 0.65 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Fig. 4 Distribution of utilityU1.
Fig. 5 Distribution of utilityU2.
3.5 Evaluation of Re-Identifications Technique
Table 7 shows the ranking of 13 teams for re-identification
measure in the order of the total number of successfully
re-identified records. In the competition, the players were
allowed to submit the estimated record index once per
anonymized data and they did not have to estimate all data.
Hence, some team carefully chose their victim data that
Fig. 6 Distribution of utilityU3.
Fig. 7 Distribution of utilityU4.
looked easy to be re-identified. For example, the 5th ranked
team achieved the highest re-id ratio, 51.4%, by perform-
ing only 8 anonymized data. The first ranked team tried to
re-identify as many data as they could and won the highest
score of 51,628 out of 174,993 records. The re-id ratio of
29.5% is smaller than the 5th team.
Figure 11 shows the scatter plot of the scores of 13
teams. Note that the plot are scattered over the space of the
re-identification probabilities (ratio) vertically and the total
KIKUCHI et al.: STUDY ON RECORD LINKAGE OF ANONYMIZIED DATA
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Fig. 8 Distribution of utilityU5.
Fig. 9 Distribution of utilitiesU1,U3,U5.
Fig. 10 Relationship between utility and security.
number of success re-identified records indicated horizon-
tally. The re-identification technique quite varies and hence
it is very hard to assume a fixed level of adversary.
We also note that the average re-identification ratio for
the teams was 20.9%. Even though the data were carefully
altered in any smart algorithm, it is almost impossible to
prevent all data from being re-identified. There is no perfect
algorithm for data anonymization. The competition result
implied the limitation of anonymization technique.
Fig. 11 Re-Id Probability with respect to total number of re-identified
records.
Table 7 Ranking of Re-identification qualities.
rank # of identified # of trials # of tests re-id
records ratio
1 51628 21 174993 29.5
2 44852 23 191659 23.4
3 40204 17 141661 28.4
4 38811 22 183326 21.2
5 34247 8 66664 51.4
6 34059 12 99996 34.1
7 31110 22 183326 17.0
8 23420 21 174993 13.4
9 13584 8 66664 20.4
10 8344 11 91663 9.1
11 1943 1 8333 23.3
12 18 2 16666 0.1
13 5 5 41665 0.0
3.6 Effect of k-Anonymity
We found that some data processed so that k-anonymity were
satisfied for some k > 1. However, the k-anonymized data
did not always improve the security against re-identification.
To see the effect of k-anonymity, we show themaximum
re-identification ratio of anonymized data with respect to the
average measures of k (S2) in Fig. 12. Most anonymized
data with k = 1 (nothing performed for k-anonymity) have
the maximum re-identification ratio distributed from 0 to
1.0, shown at the left edge in the figure. In the figure, the
highest k is at S2 = 107 and its re-identification is almost
zero. Generally, higher S2 data are more secure against re-
identification than the data without k-anonymity. However,
there are some exception around S2 of 30.
Figure 13 illustrates the bar-plot of re-identification ra-
tio for each of minimum k (S1). The mean re-identification
for k > 1 is 0.013, which is smaller than that of k = 1.
Note the mean of data for k = 3 is worse than that of k = 1.
Hence, a naive processing for k-anonymity is not necessarily
significant for security.
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Fig. 12 Re-identification ratio with respect to mean k-anonimity (S2).
Fig. 13 Bar-plot of re-identification ratio with respect to k.
Fig. 14 Ratio of re-identification methods.
3.7 Effect of AYA Re-Identification
Finally, we evaluate the re-identification algorithm as an
countermeasure of the cheating permuted data.
Figure 14 illustrates the ratio of method successfully
performed to re-identify records, where the ratio are indi-
cated by the length of bars. The most major method was
made by users, labeled as “Max User”, followed by “Max
E1-E4” employed the sample re-identification. The some
data, e.g., third one from the right, has the long bar for the
label “AYA”, which means that the data might be processed
by the cheating permutation.
4. Conclusions
We have studied reasonable methods for evaluating the qual-
ity of data anonymization in the style of a competition. We
have designed the measures for anonymized data in terms of
data utility and security against the threat of re-identification.
We have developed a competition platform that enables play-
ers to participate from remote sites.
As far as we know, this is the first data-anonymization
competition in the world wide. We believe that it is a signif-
icant undertaking because the competition style is attractive
to many engineers and the techniques are evaluated in a
common environment. Therefore, methodologies for use-
ful and secure data anonymization are sure to be improved
via the competition. We now plan to analyze the results of
our competition to identify the most significant elements in
anonymization.
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